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end-users, and has not been studied extensively. This thesis comprises an informa-
tion security risk assessment of smartphone use in Finland using Bayesian networks.
The primary research method in this thesis is a knowledge-based approach to
building a causal Bayesian network model of information security risks and
consequences. The risks, consequences, probabilities and impacts are identified
from domain experts in a 2-stage interview process with 8 experts as well as from
existing research and statistics. This information is then used to construct a
model which is flexible and lends itself to different use cases such as sensitivity
and scenario analysis. This model can also be extended when new data becomes
available.
The results show that smartphone use is accompanied by a wide variety
of different information security risks such as advanced shoulder surfing techniques
and unintentional data disclosure through legitimate applications. Although some
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Käytössä olevien älypuhelinten määrä on kasvanut eksponentiaalisesti viimei-
simmän vuosikymmenen aikana ja tämä muutos on tuonut mukanaan täysin
uudenlaisia tietoturvariskejä. Vaikka loppukäyttäjillä on keskimäärin kohtuulliset
yleistiedot perinteisten tietokoneiden tietoturvasta, ei älypuhelinten tietoturva
ole vielä vastaavalla tavalla yleistietoa, eikä sitä ole tutkittu yhtä paljon. Tämä
työ koostuu älypuhelinten tietoturvan riskikartoituksesta ja koskee nykyhetken
Suomea ja käyttää menetelmänä Bayes-verkkoja.
Ensisijainen tutkimusmenetelmä tässä työssä on kausaalisen Bayes-verkon
rakentaminen tutkimustiedon sekä asiantuntijoiden tietämyksen perusteella. Älypu-
helinten tietoturvaan liittyvät riskit, seuraukset, todennäköisyydet ja vaikutukset
kartoitetaan kahdeksalta aiheasiantuntijalta kaksivaiheisen haastatteluprosessin
aikana sekä olemassa olevista tutkimuksista ja tilastoista. Kerätyn tiedon avulla
rakennetaan joustava malli, jota voidaan käyttää useaan käyttötarkoitukseen kuten
herkkyysanalyysiin ja skenaarioanalyysiin. Mallia voidaan myös laajentaa, kun
uutta tietoa tulee saataville.
Työn tulokset osoittavat, että älypuhelimen käyttöön liittyy laaja skaala
tietoturvariskejä, kuten edistyneet salakatselun menetelmät sekä tahaton tiedonja-
ko asiallisten mobiilisovellusten kautta. Useimmat tässä työssä käsitellyt riskit ovat
vahvasti riippuvaisia käyttäjän omista toimista, vaikka joitain riskejä käyttäjän
voi olla vaikeaa tai jopa mahdotonta välttää. Käyttäjien tietoturvatietoisuuden
lisäämiselle on näin ollen tarvetta.
Avainsanat: älypuhelin, tietoturva, riskikartoitus, riskianalyysi, Bayes-verkko.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The global number of smartphone users has increased rapidly since the advent of the
first Apple iPhone in 2007 and already surpassed 1 billion in 2012 [48]. In Finland,
the share of smartphones relative to all mobile handsets in use exceeded 50 % in
2013 [59]. As smartphones have become powerful enough to run most of the typical
functionalities used on laptop or desktop computers, users are effectively migrating
their computing tasks from traditional computers to smartphones. While traditional
computer security is common knowledge and even end-users typically employ security
software such as anti-virus on their computer, smartphone security is not as well
understood among end-users.
Research concerning specific smartphone vulnerabilities exists in large numbers.
Terms such as mobile malware and mobile phishing already return numerous matches
in research paper searches. However, comprehensive risk assessments of smartphone
use are not readily available. It is not immediately clear how much mobile mal-
ware contributes to the information security breaches that occur via smartphones,
for example. Moreover, it is unclear how much smartphone use contributes to all
information security breaches.
1.2 Research questions and objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to perform a high-level risk assessment of in-
formation security related to smartphone usage. As a secondary objective, this
research aims to design and implement a practical risk assessment process for elic-
iting information from multiple experts and consolidating this information into a
Bayesian network. The outcome of this risk assessment is a Bayesian network model
of information security risks, which can be used for various purposes such as scenario
and sensitivity analysis.
This research aims to answer at least the following questions.
1. What are the most important causes of information security breaches via
smartphones?
2. How much do smartphone users’ own actions contribute to their information
security or lack thereof?
1.3 Scope
The following statements define the scope of risks to be included in this high-level
risk assessment:
1. The scope of this thesis includes risks that are directly related to information
security, such as network-based attacks or malicious software.
22. The scope of this thesis also includes such risks which are not directly related to
information security but which have consequences that are. Examples include
technical failures of a device or network.
3. The scope of this thesis excludes all risks that do not fulfil at least one of the
two categories defined in statements 1 and 2. Examples include the health
risks associated with prolonged smartphone use.
4. Risks that are not relevant to smartphone use in Finland at the time of this
research are excluded from the scope of this thesis.
The most important risks identified during this risk assessment are discussed indi-
vidually in this thesis and in the resulting model. However, other risks also exist
which are in the scope of this thesis as defined above. These risks are included in
the model as latent risks, which are not necessarily discussed individually but are
taken into account when determining the quantitative values of the model. The risk
assessment in this thesis is performed at a high level and as such, in-depth analysis
of specific technical scenarios or consequences is out of the scope of this thesis.
1.4 Research methods
The research methods used in this thesis are literature review, expert interviews and
Bayesian network modelling and analysis. Figure 1 gives a high-level description of
the risk analysis process.
Figure 1: High level overview of risk analysis process.
3First, relevant a priori information is reviewed from literature in order to determine
the known assets and risks related to smartphone use. This information is then
utilized as a basis for interviews with domain experts. Based on the information
gathered from the experts, a Bayesian network model of the risks and consequences
is created. This model is then used for further analysis of the risks.
The Bayesian network modelling is performed using a software solution named
Agenarisk [90]. Alternative software tools for Bayesian network modelling include
BayesiaLab [87], Bayes Server [88] and Netica [89], for example. Bayesian networks
are chosen as the research method due to their advantages presented in section 2.2.3.
Although Bayesian networks have been applied to information security risk analysis,
the method has rarely been applied to smartphone security research.
1.5 Thesis structure
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 describes background
information concerning smartphones and their usage as well as Bayesian networks
and prior research. Section 3 describes the risk assessment process including the
literature review, the expert elicitation process and their combined results. Section
4 describes the construction of the Bayesian network model and results derived
from the model. Section 5 discusses the applicability, possible use cases and further
development of the model and improvements for the process used. Lastly, section 6
concludes and summarizes the thesis.
42 Background
2.1 Smartphone characteristics and usage
The term smartphone is defined in various ways in literature. Some definitions
describe these as handheld personal computers [42], some refer to the devices’ mo-
bility and some to extensibility with downloadable applications [43]. In this thesis,
smartphones are defined as mobile phones that (1) can be extended with third-
party-developed applications and that (2) can perform some functionalities usually
performed by desktop or laptop computers. The device characteristics of smart-
phones are discussed in more detail in subsection 2.1.1. Within this thesis, the terms
smartphone and mobile device are used interchangeably.
An integral part of a mobile phone is its operating system (OS), which provides the
device’s computing infrastructure and defines its application platform. As is discussed
in subsection 2.1.2, a significant amount of the users’ time on smartphones is spent
with downloaded applications. Thus the application platform has a considerable
impact on the features, user experience and security of the device.
The three most used mobile operating systems currently are Google’s Android,
Apple’s iOS and Microsoft’s Windows Phone [44]. Examples of operating systems
with lower market shares include RIM’s Blackberry, Nokia’s Symbian, Mozilla’s
Firefox OS and Jolla’s Sailfish OS. The momentary distribution different operating
systems in use is difficult to estimate, because devices are frequently decommissioned
or recycled. However, quite accurate statistics exist concerning the amount of mobile
devices sold. Figure 2 shows the distribution of smartphones sold globally in Q4
2014 according to the International Data Corporation [44]. According to figure 2, the
majority of devices sold were running Android while iOS accounted for approximately
20 % of devices.
Figure 2: Mobile operating system market share in Q4 2014 [44]
5Although mobile applications can be developed by anyone with the required skills,
they are usually distributed through a virtual application store managed by the
developers of the OS, who have taken different approaches to their application stores.
Android has the most open application store [5], the Play Store, in which applications
are not subjected to manual verification before initial distribution [45]. Therefore,
malicious applications often spread through the application store, although usually
for a very limited amount of time [75]. In contrast, Apple’s App Store employs a
more restrictive approach wherein applications are manually screened pre-emptively
[45], which can be very effective at inhibiting malicious applications. However, the
insufficient security of an application can be difficult to detect even in manual testing.
2.1.1 Device characteristics
Smartphones typically have a powerful processor with the computing power equiva-
lent to an older desktop computer. The devices are thus able to run a majority of
functionalities that are usually performed on desktop or laptop computers. However,
the operating system infrastructure also exhibits many differences from traditional
computers such as the programming languages supported and the sandboxing of ap-
plications that is utilized in most operating systems for both stability and security [46].
Mobile devices also have various built-in security measures such as device pass-
codes, SIM card PIN codes, application sandboxing, application permissions and
storage encryption. A traditional security function is the SIM card PIN code, which
prevents many scenarios of unauthorized use of a mobile subscription. Another typical
security measure is authentication to unlock the device itself. The authentication
method itself can be anything from a numeric code or pattern lock to biometric
identification such as a fingerprint.
In order to communicate with other devices and the physical world, modern smart-
phones support several different communication or data transport technologies. These
can be categorized in the following way:
Cellular network interface
The most traditional cellular technology used by mobile phones for voice calls
is GSM. In addition to GSM, smartphones generally support newer cellular
technologies with significantly higher bandwidth that are better suited for data
transfer. Current technologies available to consumers in Finland such as LTE
can support transfer speeds of more than 100 Mbps.
Wireless LAN (WLAN) interface
Most smartphones include an interface for connections to Wireless Local Area
Networks (WLAN), which are based on the standard IEEE 802.11. Several
different versions of the standard exist which mainly differ by their transfer
speeds. Public WLAN networks are common throughout the world restaurants,
hotels and airports, for examples.
6Personal Area Network (PAN) interface
Smartphones often support several PAN technologies such as Bluetooth, Infrared
or Near Field Communication (NFC). These technologies provide low-cost,
ad hoc, short distance connections between devices. Bluetooth is a wireless
technology, originally based on standard IEEE 802.15.1, which is widely used
for data transfer between a smartphone and other connected devices such as
hands-free headsets or smartwatches. NFC is a communication technology used
at very short distance, often only a couple of centimetres, and is employed in
contactless payment systems.
Each device also has an internal memory whose size usually ranges from several
gigabytes upward, which can on some devices be expanded using an external memory
card. Due to the extensive storage size, the devices often store large amounts of the
user’s data as well as temporary data used by the OS and applications. A typical
mobile user’s device might contain for example all email messages sent and received
on his accounts during the previous month.
The primary input interface of modern smartphones is most often a touchscreen.
However, devices with various types of keyboards also exist. In addition to the pri-
mary input interface, smartphones utilize various sensors for monitoring the physical
world. Google’s Android’s developer documentation categorizes these sensors into
the following three broad categories [47]:
Position sensors
Position sensors aim to determine the physical position of a device. The
different types of sensors offer different degrees of precision and accuracy, and
are often combined in order to obtain reliable results. Examples of specific
sensors used for this purpose are magnetometers and orientation sensors. In
addition, the Global Positioning System (GPS) and WLAN interface are often
also used for determining the geographical position of the device.
Motion sensors
The motion sensors measure real-time movement of the device. This is accom-
plished by combining measurements of acceleration forces and rotational forces
along all three axes. Sensors used for motion sensing include accelerometers,
gravity sensors, gyroscopes and rotational sensors [47].
Environmental sensors
Environmental sensors measure various environmental parameters which can
include air temperature, pressure and humidity, for example. Other common
environmental sensors include illumination sensors and proximity sensors, which
aim to determine the devices proximity to other objects such as a table or
the user’s ear. The microphone and camera of a mobile device can also be
interpreted as environmental sensors.
72.1.2 Typical usage
According to global research, 80 % of online users owned a smartphone in 2014 and 75
% of these users accessed the internet through their smartphones monthly [8]. Out of
all mobile phones shipped in Q3 2014, 70 % were smartphones [49]. In 2014, a global
survey found out that users spend on average 1.85 hours online via a smartphone
each day [8].
Due to the mobile nature of smartphones, they are used in various contexts. Table 1
describes five contexts and their respective shares of interaction time with smart-
phones, as identified by Karikoski and Soikkeli [60] through analysing mobile network
cell ID and WLAN data. However, the sample used in the study was biased toward
students and thus does not necessarily represent an accurate estimate of usage in
the workplace.
Context Description Interaction
time
Home The user’s home 53 %
Office The user’s workplace 12 %
Abroad Not in one’s home country 3 %
Other meaningful A frequently visited context which does not
have the characteristics of home or office
8 %
Elsewhere Any contexts that do not fit in any of the
former categories
24 %
Table 1: Smartphone usage contexts and their respective shares of interaction time
[60]
The majority of smartphone users use mobile applications every day [5]. According
to research performed in the United States, 89 % of smartphone interaction time
is spent using various applications while 11 % of the time is spent on the web [4].
Social networking applications amount to approximately 25 % of the time used on
mobile applications while mobile games amount to 16 % [5]. The distribution of
users’ time on different mobile application categories is further described in figure 3.
8Figure 3: Time spent on mobile applications per application category
Another noteworthy application category consists of the mobile payment systems and
banking services whose use has increased rapidly during the previous years. In 2014,
12.4 % of all payment transactions in Europe were already initiated from mobile
devices [50] and approximately 50 % of smartphone users in the US had used mobile
banking services on their smartphones [7].
92.2 Bayesian networks
2.2.1 Definition
Bayes’ theorem is a mathematical application of conditional probabilities, which
relates current and prior probabilities. The mathematical statement of Bayes’ theorem
can be seen in equation 1 below,
P (A|B) = P (B|A)P (A)
P (B) , (1)
where A and B are events. P(A) and P(B) represent the probability of occurrence
for events A and B, respectively, independent of the other event. P(A|B) represents
the conditional probability of event A’s occurrence when given that B has occurred.
A Bayesian network (BN), Bayes network or Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is
a probabilistic model used for portraying variables and their direct dependencies.
The model is represented using a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in which variables
are portrayed by nodes and their causal relationships by directed edges [22] such as
in figure 4. The existence of a directed edge between nodes A and B indicates that
the nodes are directly dependent on each other, whereas the direction of the edge
indicates the direction of the causal relationship. The edge direction is usually chosen
in the direction of cause to effect. In such contexts, node A in figure 4 is referred to
as the child node and node B as the parent node. Lack of an edge indicates that
there is no direct dependency between the nodes.
Figure 4: Simple example of Bayesian network
The graphical model in figure 4 does not define any probabilities, states or impacts of
the network and is thus referred to as the qualitative model of the Bayesian network.
To extend this qualitative model, a Node Probability Table (NPT) defines for each
node the probability distribution of the node’s possible states. If the node has one or
more parent nodes, the NPT describes the node’s probability distribution conditional
on its parents’ states. Otherwise, the node’s probability distribution is called a
marginal probability. The set of NPTs in a network constitutes the quantitative
model of the Bayesian network.
Bayes’ theorem is used as a basis for Bayesian inference, a method of statistical
inference, which is used for updating the probability distribution of a variable based
on evidence observed [81]. The Bayesian network builds on this inference to create a
network of variables that obey Bayes’ theorem and are subject to Bayesian inference.
A simple example of a Bayesian network is the Naive Bayes classifier, which has been
widely used for probabilistic classification.
10
To summarize, the Bayesian network model consists of three parts: (1) the set
of variables to be analysed, (2) a graphical structure that describes the dependencies
between the variables, hereafter referred to as the qualitative model, and (3) a set of
conditional probability distributions, one for each variable, hereafter referred to as
the quantitative model.
2.2.2 Properties and construction
An important attribute of Bayesian networks is the propagation of probabilities
between nodes, which contributes to the advantages of using a Bayesian network
described in subsection 2.2.3. Probabilities are propagated between nodes with direct
connections but also between nodes that are indirectly connected through another
node or set of nodes. These indirect connections can be described using a criterion
named d-separation [22], which determines whether two sets of nodes X and Y are
independent of each other given node set Z.
To illustrate the d-separation of nodes, three essential cases should be discussed.
Figure 5a illustrates a serial connection between nodes or node sets X and Y. If
the value of Z is known, any knowledge about X is irrelevant to Y, thus X and Y
are said to be d-separated given Z. The same statement applies to the diverging
connection or common cause case illustrated in figure 5b.
Figure 5c illustrates a converging connection wherein nodes X and Y have a common
effect. If no evidence of Z is observed, knowledge about node X is irrelevant to
Y. However, if the value of node Z is known, evidence of X affects the probability
distribution of node Y. Thus, unlike in the previous two cases, evidence of node X
can be transmitted to Y given Z. Nodes X and Y are thus d-connected given Z.
(a) Serial connection (b) Diverging connection (c) Converging connection
Figure 5: Indirect connection scenarios in Bayesian networks
The methods of creating a Bayesian network model can be roughly divided into (1)
data-driven and (2) knowledge-based approaches. These methods are sometimes also
referred to as bottom-up and top-down approaches, respectively. In the data-driven
method, machine learning is used to identify the network structure and parameters.
The methods for structural learning can be further divided into two main categories:
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(1) CI-test-based approaches and (2) optimization-based search methods [84]. The
first method uses conditional independence (CI) assumptions to infer the structure
of the network [84], while the second uses a search strategy and scoring function to
identify the network structure that best fits the given set of data [85]. The scoring
functions often utilize the minimum description length (MDL) principle introduced
by Jorma Rissanen [91]. Parameters are then estimated from data using methods
such as the maximum likelihood approach [92].
In the knowledge-based approach, the network structure is determined using causal
knowledge of domain experts [86]. The parameters are identified from existing data
or elicited from domain experts, often combining both sources. These methods are
further discussed in section 3.3.
2.2.3 Advantages and disadvantages
Classical methods of causal and frequency analysis include, in addition to Bayesian
networks, Fault Trees [78], Markov chains [79] and Petri nets [80]. Fault trees are
commonly used in causal analysis but can be completely replaced by Bayesian net-
works. Markov chains and Petri nets on the other hand are more frequential methods
and are not suitable for causal analysis.
Compared to alternative methods, Bayesian networks exhibit the following ad-
vantages:
1. Efficient consolidation of hard data and expert opinion [82].
2. Ability to capture causal knowledge even from domain experts with little or no
statistical experience [23].
3. Easily understandable format for visualizing causal relationships between vari-
ables [22].
4. Suitability for simple expert elicitation methods [24].
5. Robustness with regards to incomplete information [82].
6. Flexibility and abundance of use cases [24].
7. Support for structural learning [82].
However, Bayesian networks also exhibit the following disadvantages:
1. Continuous variables must be discretized before use [51]. However, Bayesian
networks are mainly a classification method, wherein this disadvantage is
negligible.
2. Determining quantitative values via expert elicitation is a complex [82] and
time-consuming process [22]. However, the number of variables to be elicited
can be reduced using methods discussed in section 3.3.3.
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2.2.4 Prior research in risk management
According to a meta-analysis of Bayesian networks research performed by Weber et
al. in 2012 [24], the number of literature references to Bayesian networks applications
in risk analysis have risen considerably during the last decade. Some of the first
documented applications of BNs in risk analysis were a decision support system
to evaluate terrorism threats by Hudson et al. in 2001 [26] and risk assessment of
structures under fire by Gulvanessian and Holicky in 2002 [25].
After the first applications during the beginning of the century, BNs have been
utilized in many fields for risk analysis. In 2004, Cornalba and Giudici [28] described
a knowledge-based Bayesian networks method which combined statistical data with
expert opinion in order to determine the risks related to banking organizations. In
2006, Kim and Seong [27] proposed a method for assessing the safety of nuclear
power plants in various contexts with a knowledge-based Bayesian network approach.
According to the authors, a significant advantage of this method was the ability to
take into account the effect of interdependency between critical systems and human
operators.
Bayraktarli et al. [52] employ Bayes networks for risk management related to
earthquakes whereas Straub [53] describes an application of Bayesian networks to
risk assessment of various kinds of natural hazards. Cheon et al. [34] propose a
method for predicting high concentrations of ozone using Bayesian networks. This
method could also be employed for other rare event prediction purposes such as fraud
detection or diagnosis. Hanea and Ale [33] discuss an approach to estimating risks
of building fires in Netherlands using Bayes networks.
Bayesian networks have also been used in the maritime field. Russell et al. [29]
describe a methodology for applying Bayesian networks to assessing the reliability of
search and rescue operations based on expert judgement while Trucco et al. [30] use
expert elicitation to construct a quantitative Bayesian network describing the risks
of maritime transportation. Eunchang et al. [54] describe a significant application of
Bayes networks to risk management of a large engineering project. The application
to the risk management of the Korean shipbuilding industry included surveying 252
industry experts. Bayesian network models have also been used for assessing the
probability of ship collision [94] and effectiveness of oil combating [95] in the Gulf of
Finland. Both studies combine prior statistical data and expert opinion to create a
quantitative safety assessment.
Duijm [31] describes the qualitative use of Bayesian networks in safety-barrier
diagrams, which are easy-to-understand graphical models used in risk analysis and
safety management. Røed et al. [32] discuss a framework called hybrid causal logic,
which combines traditional risk analysis tools with causal knowledge-based Bayesian
networks. They also review an application of the framework to both the aviation
industry and the offshore oil and gas industry.
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Peltola and Kekolahti [76] use Bayesian networks for risk assessment of the Finnish
TETRA PSS network, where 10 risk sources such as sabotage contribute to unavail-
ability of the network. The authors use expert knowledge to construct a quantitative
BN model, which is used to analyse the effects of different risk controls such as access
control on service availability.
2.2.5 Prior research in information security
A paper by Mo et al. [35] proposes a quantitative model for evaluating a firm’s cyber
security readiness by use of Bayesian networks. The proposed model uses a firm’s
security profile and data breach statistics as input to a Bayesian network model of
vulnerabilities, threats and risks. The model gives as output a universal risk score
that could be used to evaluate the state of information security in firms.
A topic that has been widely discussed in research papers during the previous five
years is modelling the interdependence of vulnerabilities in IT with Bayesian networks.
Although individual vulnerabilities can be exploited for limited gain, combining vul-
nerabilities can allow an attacker to penetrate several layers of defence for example
in an enterprise network. These attack scenarios can be described using attack graphs.
Figure 6 describes an example network structure (left) and a respective attack
graph (right). In this example, exploiting either vulnerability 1 or both vulnerability
2 and 3 on the web server allows access to the file server, where vulnerability 4 can
be exploited. This in turn allows the attacker to exploit either vulnerability 5 or 6
on the end-user devices in the internal network.
Figure 6: Example attack graph
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An attack graph such as figure 6, or a set of attack graphs, can be further extended
into a complete Bayesian network by determining the marginal and conditional prob-
abilities of the nodes such as done by Xie et al. [41]. Most known vulnerabilities have
been studied and evaluated according to standards such as the Common Vulnerability
Scoring System (CVSS) which is used by several public Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) databases to represent metrics such as exploitability and
impact. These databases can be leveraged for populating a Bayesian network’s NPTs
automatically. [38]
Dantu and Kolan [39] extend the Bayesian network model of attack scenarios with
different attacker types such as a corporate insider or a political "hacktivist". Noel
et al. [36] use the Bayes network model to evaluate expected return on investment
regarding different information security investments. Farmad et al. [37] also describe
a quantitative method for performing cost-benefit analysis as part of the Bayes
network vulnerability assessment.
The BN models of attack scenarios could also be utilized in intrusion detection
systems (IDS) for determining the most likely attack path in the event of a breach.
Xie et al. discuss the possibility of using this information for mitigating attacks in
real-time as effectively as possible [41].
Sommestad et al. [40] present a framework for analysing cyber security using Bayesian
statistics. The proposed method merges Bayesian attack networks with abstract
models to describe a system’s cyber security. Wang and Guo [77] propose a method
of using Bayes Networks to automatically categorize software vulnerabilities based
on their type.
This high-level risk assessment does not include analysis of specific technical at-
tack scenarios and individual vulnerabilities.
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3 Risk assessment
3.1 Risk assessment approach
Risk assessment is usually defined as a method for identifying the threats that a
specific group of assets are vulnerable to and determining the threats’ probabilities
and impacts on each asset. On the other hand, the ISO/IEC 27005 risk management
standard refers to this aforementioned process as risk analysis. According to this
widely used standard, risk assessment additionally includes evaluating these risks
against the risk evaluation and acceptance criteria. The standard also defines a task
named risk treatment which includes evaluation of actions that could help avoid,
reduce or transfer the risk.
Peltier [9] defines the information security risk assessment process as the following 6
steps. Figure 7 describes these steps in the form of a Bayesian network.
1. Asset definition is the step where assets are identified and defined. An asset
in this context could be the availability of the smartphone.
2. Threat identification includes identifying all undesirable events that affect
the one or more assets in a negative way. A threat in this context could be
losing the smartphone.
3. Determining probability of occurrence is the action of assigning a proba-
bility to each threat defined in step 2. These probabilities can be conditional
on several different variables.
4. Determining the impact of the threat is the process of determining which
assets each threat affects and with what severity.
5. Controls recommended is the step where mitigating controls and safeguards
are identified. A control in this context could be to not leave the smartphone
unattended.
6. Documentation of the risk assessment results.
Figure 7: Information security risk assessment process as defined by Peltier [9]
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3.2 Literature-based assessment
3.2.1 Assets
In risk analysis, assets are subject to risks. If a risk is realized, an asset is affected in
some negative way. Thus by definition, assets are something that should be protected
from risks, which can be accomplished by reducing the probability or impact of the
risk. In addition to assets, this thesis also discusses consequences, which can be
viewed as risks’ effects on assets.
A classic categorization of the general information security goals or attributes is the
triad confidentiality, integrity and availability, often dubbed "CIA". These attributes
are closely related to the definition of assets as they are what is generally required of
assets.
Many different categorizations of smartphone assets can be found in literature.
One example of the simplest categorizations is the one used by Jeon et al. [17] below:
1. Private information
2. Device
3. Applications
In this approach, one category includes all information that should not be made
public, which can be of various forms and sources. Some of the information is
deliberately stored on the device or SIM card by the user such as contact information,
sent and received SMS messages as well as documents stored on the device. Other
types of data can be less visible to the user such as temporary files, browser cache or
data stored by a persistent login functionality. Also, some data is not stored on the
device at all and is only available in real time such as usage information and location
data.
Another category in the list by Jeon et al. is defined for the smartphone device
itself. The smartphone device can evidently have both financial value to the user
as well as be valued for its availability. The availability aspect of a smartphone not
only comprises the physical availability of the device but also the availability of its
functionalities to the user. Thus the authors also include in this category system
resources such as the battery charge, CPU computing power and memory, which are
required for the smartphone to fulfil its duties to the user.
The third and last category defined by Jeon et al. comprises applications. The
authors reason that applications should be included as an individual category be-
cause of two reasons; (1) commercial applications can have a price and (2) applications
can store and handle sensitive information.
In a security assessment related specifically to Android devices, Shabtai et al. [13]
define a similar list to that of Jeon et al. In this list, which can be seen below, the
device hardware and device resources are defined as separate categories:
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1. Private/confidential content stored on the device
2. Applications and services
3. Device resources (battery power, communication, processing power etc.)
4. Hardware
The categorization by Shabtai et al. includes one broad category that comprises all
applications and services, i.e. virtually all functions that can be performed by users
on smartphones. While the categorization by Jeon et al. focused on the data and
cost related to applications, Shabtai et al. also view the availability of applications
and services as an asset.
Theoharidou et al. [10] propose a personal risk assessment method for smartphones
and therein define the following four categories of assets:
1. Device
2. Connectivity
3. Data
4. Applications
The main difference between this and the previous two categorizations is that the
authors define connectivity as an individual category. A wide variety of functionalities
make use of the connectivity methods described in section 2.1.1 and as such, the
availability of the connections can be viewed as an asset. On the other hand, the
confidentiality and integrity of data transfers are also of value to the user. A user
would for example prefer that instant messages reach the recipient confidentially and
unaltered.
Similarly to the approach of Theoharidou et al., Ledermüller and Clarke [20] separate
connectivity channels from the other assets. However, Ledermüller and Clarke divide
this category further into (1) communication by voice and messaging and (2) network
data access. According to the authors, the following asset categories were chosen
based on the identified mobile phone usage trends and application market offering:
1. Communication by voice and messaging
2. Network data access
3. Applications
4. Device and stored data
A report by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
(ENISA) [11] defines the following categorizations of smartphone assets:
1. Personal data
2. Corporate intellectual property
3. Classified information (governmental)
4. Financial assets
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5. Device and service availability and functionality
6. Personal and political reputation
Compared to the other categorizations presented, the categorization by ENISA fo-
cuses less on the technical aspects of a smartphone and more on the contexts that
smartphones are used in. This list introduces three separate categories of data, based
not on the type or form of the data but rather the source and impact of the data.
Most data stored on smartphones likely relates either to the user’s personal life or
work. The separation between the sources of data demonstrates the different value
and degree of confidentiality assigned to and expect from data from different sources.
Also, business or governmental data stored on a smartphone is more likely to also
be backed up elsewhere than personal data. Thus, the value of the integrity of data
depends on the source. The categorization used by ENISA even separates corporate
data from governmental data due to the different implications of a confidentiality
breach of the data.
In addition to the assets technically associated with a smartphone, risks related to
smartphones can also have direct financial consequences. The device itself has a value
and will most likely have to be replaced if it is stolen. Also, the user’s financial assets
are related to the smartphone through mobile subscription billing and possible mobile
payment systems. As the final category of the list, ENISA introduces personal and
political reputation. The reputation of a user could be affected through the disclo-
sure of personal information as well as impersonating a user through their smartphone.
For the purpose of this risk assessment, the following list of 6 assets was defined:
1. Confidentiality of personal data
2. Confidentiality of business or governmental data
3. Integrity and availability of data
4. Financial assets
5. Availability of device and functionalities
6. Access to other devices and services
According to this categorization, the confidentiality of personal data and business or
governmental data are separated as two different assets. Reasons for this include
the different implications of a confidentiality breach of the data based on its type as
well as the different forms that the data exists in depending on its source. Personal
data can include for example photos, browser history and sensor information such as
location data, which can be collected from the device over a period of time. On the
other hand, confidential data is mostly comprised of emails and documents stored on
the device. Both categories are likely to include data transmitted over communication
interfaces.
A third category comprises the integrity and availability of all different types of
data. In the context of this assessment, this asset mostly concerns data stored on the
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actual device. Separate categories are also introduced for financial assets as well as
the availability of the device and its functionalities. Financial assets can be affected
by events such as excessive charging through the user’s mobile subscription, extra
charges in a mobile payment system and repair or replacement costs of the device.
The availability of the device and its functionalities can be completely lost due to
theft of the device or partly diminished due to a technical failure, for example.
In addition to the five first assets, smartphones are also used for accessing a plethora
of other services used for various purposes. Possible services on smartphones include
voice calls, SMS messages, video streaming services, social networks and online
banking, for example. Many applications or services assume that authentication
of the user is performed on device level and thus no additional authentication is
required before allowing the user to access applications or functionalities. A user
might also store usernames and passwords on their device, giving an attacker access
to also those services. The implications of a security breach concerning these services
depend completely on the nature of the services enabled on the device and the
security measures employed in these. Thus a sixth asset category is introduced for
the security of access to other services and devices.
In addition to naturally being dependent on the risks, consequences are in some cases
also dependent on each other. For example the leakage of credit card information can
result in financial consequences. However, the consequence categories were defined
so that these dependencies would be minimized. An in-depth evaluation of these
dependencies is not performed in this thesis.
To summarize, the following 6 smartphone assets were identified: (1) confiden-
tiality of personal data, (2) confidentiality of business or governmental data, (3)
integrity and availability of data, (4) financial assets, (5) availability of device and
functionalities and (6) access to other devices and services.
3.2.2 Threats
Information security threats are events that have an undesirable effect on one or
more assets, a probability of occurrence and an impact. The probability of a threat
can be conditional on many other variables such as whether another risk has been
realized or not. The impact of a threat can vary based on the asset examined.
The threat space of smartphones is quite diverse due to their mobility, high comput-
ing power and versatile purposes of use as described in section 2.1. A guideline for
managing the security of mobile devices by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) [21] raises many important high-level threats. Mobile devices
usually lack physical security controls that have been characteristic of other IT
devices and in addition to being used at the office and at home, a smartphone is often
used in various public places and means of transportation, where the devices can
be connected to untrusted networks. The use cases of smartphones include a large
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amount of potentially untrusted applications and interaction with other untrusted
systems. Also, smartphones can encounter untrusted content of new types such as
Quick Response codes (QR). Another new aspect of the security of smartphones are
the use of location services.
Threats can be categorized in several ways such as based on the assets they impact,
the type of impact that they have or the realm in which they exist. Theoharidou et
al. [10] divide threats into the following four realms and for the sake of readability,
the threats are discussed roughly in this order:
1. Device
2. Network connectivity
3. Operating system
4. Applications
The smartphone device itself is vulnerable to many physical threats such as loss or
theft of the device. Accurate statistics of smartphone thefts and losses is scarcely
available, however, according to survey research published by Consumer Reports
[62], 3.1 million smartphones were stolen and 1.4 million lost in the US during 2013.
According to Statista [61], the total number of smartphone users in the US in 2013
was 144.5 million and thus approximately 3.1 % of smartphones in total were lost or
stolen. According to a benchmark study by McAfee and Ponemon Institute in 2011
[69], employer-provided smartphones account for 62 % of all smartphones in use and
approximately 4.3 % of these are lost or stolen each year. This supports the above
approximation of 3.1 %.
Another type of physical threat is unauthorized physical access to the device, which
can happen for example when the device is stolen or lost and found by another
person. If a device does not require authentication such as a security code or facial
recognition before usage, an unauthorized user could access the device immediately
after gaining physical access. Symantec performed in 2012 an experiment [83] where
50 smartphones were intentionally lost and then remotely monitored for activity.
The study found that 89 % of these devices were accessed for personal data and 83
% for corporate-related data by the finders.
A report by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
[11] discusses improper decommissioning of a device, which refers to the disposal of
the phone in such a way that another party is able to recover information from the
device. The confidentiality of data can thus be compromised even after a device is
decommissioned or recycled.
Subsection 2.1.1 briefly discussed the large amount of sensors integrated into modern
smartphones, which can collect an immense amount of data about the user. Even if
this data is never stored permanently on the device, an attacker with real time access
to the device, for example through surveillance software, can collect this information.
21
Surveillance software can be installed either by gaining physical access to the device
or through malware distribution method. Many legitimate applications exist that
can be misused for covert surveillance.
Wang et al. [18] also introduce battery exhaustion attacks as a threat. In or-
der for a smartphone to fulfil its duties to the user, a smartphone requires among
other things battery power, computing resources and free memory. Attacks that
drain or otherwise overuse these resources must also be considered.
While traditional computers are relatively rarely used in public places or trans-
portation, smartphones can and often are used anywhere and everywhere. This raises
a concern of other people eavesdropping on phone calls and watching a user use
his smartphone, i.e. "shoulder surfing". Business users who use their laptops on
airplanes etc. often protect their screen with a privacy filter that makes it more
difficult to view the content of the screen from the sides. However, such privacy
filters have not become common for smartphones.
Although it might be difficult to accurately spot the username and password written
by a fellow bus passenger with a naked eye, shoulder surfing can also be performed
in more advanced ways. A team of researchers from the University of North Carolina
developed a mechanism [70] for detecting passwords written using cheap mobile video
cameras. In addition to the method being surprisingly accurate, the team was even
able to detect passwords by recording a reflection of the smartphone screen from a
user’s sunglasses.
Smartphones use several different connectivity channels for data transfers such
as described in section 2.1.1, and each packet sent on these networks is vulnerable
to attacks. On unencrypted WLAN networks, such as the public networks found at
restaurants and airports, sniffing other user’s data transfers is feasible even without
special skills or equipment. Such scenarios could also lead to a Man in the Middle
(MitM) attack. Due to the reliance of smartphones on their connectivity channels,
smartphones are also vulnerable to network-based Denial of Service (DoS) attacks as
well as situations where a network is congested for other reasons. A recent example
of a DoS vulnerability is the iPhone notification centre bug wherein most iPhone
devices could be crashed by sending a text message that includes certain Arabic
characters. However, a more sophisticated attack could do much more than crash
individual smartphones.
A risk assessment by ENISA [11] raises another concern related to the connec-
tivity channels and mobility of a smartphone. By spoofing an access point that
a user connects to, an attacker will be able to read and intercept all unencrypted
data sent on the channel. In the case of WLAN access points, an attacker could
simply choose an SSID similar or identical to that of a trusted network. Incautious
and security unaware users would likely choose this network for internet access.
On the other hand, it can be possible to spoof an access point or base station in
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such a way that the smartphone itself cannot distinguish between a legitimate and
illegitimate access point. A recent example of such an attack is the secret surveil-
lance uncovered by Aftenposten in Norway in 2014 [56]. Their tracking revealed
several IMSI-catchers, which are essentially fake base stations used for data collection.
Several threats also specifically concern the cellular network connectivity of a smart-
phone. Old versions of SIM cards have been particularly vulnerable to cloning,
wherein an attacker could impersonate another user on the network. Milligan and
Hutcheson [14] as well as Wang et al. [18] raise a concern that given access to the
right equipment, an attacker could eavesdrop signals on the cellular network in order
to listen in on GSM voice calls.
Wireless connections on the GSM network between smartphones and base stations are
encrypted using stream ciphers such as A5/1, A5/2 and A5/3. Several vulnerabilities
exist in all of these such as the ciphertext-only attack documented by Barkan et
al. [74]. Unlike most other known methods for compromising GSM encryption,
the ciphertext-only attack is feasible in real-time and does not require significant
resources. Compromise of the GSM encryption enables various attack scenarios such
as call hijacking, altering of data messages and call theft [74].
Several specific risk assessments have been performed regarding the risks related to
individual mobile platforms. Android is likely the most researched platform due to
its wide usage as well as its relatively open application development and distribution
policy. Examples of the Android risk assessments can be found in [13] and [19] and
an analysis of Android smartphone security mechanisms in a paper written by Khan
et al. [15]. A comparative security evaluation of the most common mobile operating
systems with regard to malware has been performed by Mylonas et al. in 2011 [16].
The research included a case study wherein average developers were tasked with
implementing and distributing location tracking malware on the different platforms.
The evaluation found that the only security measures that prevented the successful
implementation and distribution were Apple’s iOS’s installation requirements and
manual pre-distribution-testing.
One threat that users might not be aware of is the unintentional disclosure of
data through legitimate applications [11]. Users may not be aware of the privacy
policy or privacy settings of applications and thus unwillingly and unknowingly share
information with the application developers or third parties. It is common for users
to install applications without first reading the respective privacy policy or terms
and conditions. The use of cloud services also introduces new risks as all data that is
transferred to a cloud service, whether unbeknown to the user or not, is vulnerable
various security risks that affect the cloud service and its infrastructure.
Phishing is a threat that has long existed on computers and is also discussed in
many smartphone risk assessments [10][11][17][18]. The relatively small screens of
smartphones could facilitate these phishing attacks as the user is not necessarily
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shown all information necessary for identifying a phishing attack. For example, a
browser application might hide the URL and certificate information, or an email
application might hide the sender’s address and instead only present the sender’s
name. According to research by Trusteer [65], mobile users who access a phishing
site are three times more likely to submit private information than desktop users.
According to research by IBM [66], approximately 50 % of the private informa-
tion harvested during a single phishing campaign, is submitted during the first hour.
After the first hour, phishing sites are often already identified by IT security vendors.
The continuous real-time use of smartphones makes it more likely that a phishing
campaign reaches the user within an hour on their mobile device than on a traditional
computer.
The non-profit OWASP organization maintains a yearly updated list of the most im-
portant technical risks that affect mobile applications. The top 10 mobile application
risks from year 2014 include the following risks [12]:
1. Weak Server Side Controls
2. Insecure Data Storage
3. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
4. Unintended Data Leakage
5. Poor Authorization and Authentication
6. Broken Cryptography
7. Client Side Injection
8. Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs
9. Improper Session Handling
10. Lack of Binary Protections
A significant amount of threats listed by OWASP have a root cause in insecure coding
methods. Mobile applications can be produced by anyone with basic coding skills
and are not necessarily suspect to thorough security testing. Even some of the most
popular mobile applications have been found to have critical security flaws [13].
In addition to insecurely designed legitimate applications, applications can also
be designed to be purposefully malicious. According to a report by Alcatel-Lucent
[63], 0.68 % of all smartphones were infected with malware at the end of year 2014.
However, the annual Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report [64] found that only
0.03 % of devices were infected with truly malicious code whereas the rest of the
infections were less aggressive pieces of software such as spyware or adware. Mobile
malware also varies based on its spreading method. The three most common types
are described in table 2.
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Disguised Covert
Standalone Standalone application
which has or is claimed to
have a useful functionality
which causes users to install
it willingly
Covert application which is
installed without user con-
sent
Embedded Malicious code is inserted
into a legitimate application
which is then repackaged
and redistributed
N/A
Table 2: Mobile malware spreading methods.
The redistribution of legitimate software with malicious code embedded would likely
be identified quickly in official application stores. However, users also install ap-
plications from outside the official stores. Most Android users are able to install
applications from outside their application store even without removing device secu-
rity restrictions.
Malicious software on smartphones can have several purposes. A report by ENISA
[11] refers to three distinct kinds of malware: (1) spyware, which is meant to stealthily
collect data from a large amount of users, (2) diallerware, which causes billing by
calls and/or messages to premium services and (3) other kinds of financial malware
such as those that collect credit card information when users make purchases on
their smartphones. Becher et al. [58] also make a distinction between diallerware and
other financial malware, which could also include attacks targeting mobile payment
systems such as Apple Pay or Danske Mobile Pay. Malicious applications can also
have other purposes such as corrupting data on the device, causing technical failures
or making the device part of a botnet.
Mobile malware has also been found to target mobile banking services. In 2014, a
mobile malware application targeting South Korean mobile bank users spread. This
application provided the user with a screen quite similar to that of a South Korean
bank’s legitimate application. However, when the user entered their credentials, these
were sent to a C&C maintained by the attackers [71].
The possible consequences of malware and vulnerabilities in legitimate software
can be dramatically increased if security and privilege restrictions imposed on the
device have been removed, which is usually referred to as "rooting" or "jail breaking"
the device. For example Android devices run each application in a dedicated Dalvik
virtual machine where it only has access to its own application data. However, this
restriction can be removed with the right skills and equipment.
25
After careful review of the discussions in existing literature, the following 19 infor-
mation security risks related to smartphone use were identified:
1. Attacks on decommissioned devices
2. Client side code injection
3. Cloning SIM card
4. Denial of Service
5. Diallerware
6. Eavesdropping
7. Loss or theft of device
8. Malware (excl. spyware, diallerware)
9. Mobile payment systems abuse
10. Network spoofing attack
11. Phishing
12. Resource abuse
13. Shoulder surfing
14. Sniffing
15. Spyware
16. Surveillance
17. Technical failure of device
18. Unauthorized physical device access
19. Unintentional data disclosure
In addition to the risks discussed above, smartphone users can also be vulnerable
to many other risks that are not related to information security such as the health
effects of smartphone use. However, the risks that are unrelated to information
security, are out of the scope of this thesis as defined in section 1.3.
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3.3 Expert elicitation
The purpose of the expert interviews was to collect the data required in order to
construct a Bayesian network model of information security risks and assets related
to smartphone use in Finland at the time of this research. To accomplish this task,
experts were queried about both the qualitative structure of the network and the
quantitative information i.e. the probabilities, impacts and strengths of mutual
dependencies of the risks as defined in subsection 2.2.
The interview process was divided into two stages. The purpose of the first stage was
to gather enough information to build a qualitative model of the information security
risks and consequences, i.e. the graphical BN structure in which nodes represent risks
or consequences, and edges indicate causal relationships. During the second stage,
this model was presented and validated with each expert after which the strengths of
dependencies and impacts were determined. In addition, both stages of the interview
process were first tested with a non-expert. Figure 8 shows a visualization of this
process.
Figure 8: High level overview of expert interview process
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A list of common risks and assets related to smartphone use was created based on
the literature assessment performed in subsection 3.2 and used to categorize the
risks and assets brought up by the interviewees. However, in trial interviews with
non-experts it was found that the term asset was difficult to define and understand
unambiguously in this context. Thus the assets were translated to consequences of
risks, which seemed easier to understand and discuss. The translations from asset in
subsection 3.2.1 to consequence are listed in table 3.
Asset Consequence
Confidentiality of personal data Leakage of personal data
Confidentiality of business or govern-
mental data
Leakage of confidential data (busi-
ness/government)
Integrity and availability of data Data loss or corruption
Financial assets Financial consequences
Availability of device and functionalities Unavailability of device or services
Access to other devices and services Unauthorized access to other devices or
services
Table 3: Mapping between risk consequence categories and asset categories
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3.3.1 Experts
The experts to be interviewed were chosen based on experience, subject matter
knowledge, current employer and position. Two main objectives were taken into
account when choosing the experts: (1) the group of experts should include various
specializations with partial overlap in order to ensure completeness of the information
available and (2) the interviewee’s experience and knowledge in the domain and their
own viewpoint should be good or very good in order to ensure the quality of the
information available. The list of experts is described in table 4. In this thesis, each
expert represents only their own subject matter knowledge and not in any way their
employer.
# Title, Organization
1 Manager, Deloitte
2 Professor, Aalto University
3 Manager, Deloitte
4 Information Security Officer, RAY
5 Senior Manager, Product Security & Privacy, Microsoft
6 Senior Researcher, Aalto University
7 Information Security Specialist, National Cyber Security Cen-
tre of Finland (NCSC-FI)
8 IT Security Manager, TeliaSonera Finland
Table 4: Interviewed experts
3.3.2 Interview stage 1
The purpose of the first stage interviews was to elicit from experts the information
required for building the qualitative causal model of the Bayesian network described in
subsection 2.2, i.e. a list of the variables involved as well as their causal dependencies.
In order to capture this information from expert interviews, two different types of
techniques are commonly used. Structured techniques involve specific questions about
predefined concepts and are thus most suitable for confirming existing knowledge.
Unstructured approaches on the other hand focus on exploring new information and
are thus well suited for use in domains for which existing knowledge is lacking or
non-existent. Nadkarni and Shenoy illustrate the unstructured approach with the
following example question: "What are the factors relevant to the decision?" [23]
Prior knowledge about the domain of this risk assessment was available but in
limited extent. Information security risks related to computing have been studied
extensively and research also exists concerning the security of smartphones. However,
the individual research papers concerning smartphone security only discuss fragments
of the whole risk space. Due to the availability of prior information but lack of
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completeness, a combination of structured and unstructured methods was used. The
interviewees were asked open questions about which threats exist in the smartphone
risk space in today’s Finland and what consequences relate to these. If required, the
interviewees were also shown the predefined list of threats described in subsection
3.2.2.
The first stage interviews roughly followed the process visualized in figure 9 and
described below. However, due to time limitations and varying amount of input
available from experts, some interviews followed this process only superficially. Re-
gardless, as much information as possible was gathered concerning each phase with
each expert. Before interviews, the experts were given prior information about the
topics to be discussed in the interview.
Figure 9: Expert elicitation stage 1 interview process
During the interviews, each expert was asked to list, according to his or her own
expertise, the 10 most important information security risks related to smartphone
use in Finland at the moment. Risk importance was defined to be based on both
probability and impact, i.e. total importance, and risks were discussed to ensure
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mutual understanding. In most interviews, the list of risks defined in subsection 3.2.2
was reviewed in order to evaluate its completeness and map the discussed risks to
the risks in this list. The interviewees were also asked to order the risks based on
total importance.
Next, the interviewees were asked to approximate how many times each risk can be
expected to occur during a year in a random sample of 10000 smartphone users in
Finland at the moment. However, determining a realistic estimation of the exact
volume of occurrence of a risk event is difficult even to domain experts in the absence
of statistics. The interviewees were then asked to list the possible consequences of
each risk without considering the severity of the consequences and to identify whether
the risks have any consequences that were not included in the consequence categories
defined in table 3. The interviewees were also asked to order the consequences based
on average importance to users. Lastly, each interviewee was asked to identify all
dependencies between risks which have a non-negligible strength.
One of the challenges of the interview process was how to clearly define the ob-
jectives of the interview without introducing bias. An important part of the interview
was the separation between threats or risks and consequences and thus the use of an
illustrative example was considered. However, while testing the interview process
on non-experts, these examples were observed to introduce anchoring [93], and thus
possibly bias, regardless of whether the example related to information security or
not. For this reason, an illustrative example was not used.
An Excel tool was designed to facilitate the interview and is described in appendix B.
Using this tool, the information needed in latter steps was automatically populated
after completion of the prior steps. For example the matrices used for gathering
information on conditional relationships were automatically filled in with the risks
and assets listed by the interviewee.
3.3.3 Interview stage 2
The main objective of the second stage interviews was to collect the information
necessary in order to construct the quantitative Bayesian network model. The quan-
titative model, as defined in section 2.2, is the set of Node Probability Tables (NPT)
assigned to the nodes of the network structure and the necessary information thus
consists of the probabilities, impact strengths and strengths of dependencies between
risks in the network. In this model, each risk was defined as a Boolean node and
each consequence as a ranked node.
The impact of a risk is often measured on scales such as low-medium-high or very
low-low-medium-high-very high. A scale with an odd number of steps is usually
preferred due to the advantage of having a middle choice, which generally makes
the scale easier to use. According to Fenton et al., experts are rarely satisfied with
3-point scales [55], however, a 5-point scale increases the difficulty of choosing an
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impact strength. A typical 3-point scale was chosen due to its simplicity and unam-
biguousness. In addition to the low-medium-high scale, some risks examined in this
assessment do not necessarily result in an impact when realized. Thus a fourth step
was added to the scale to describe situations where the impact is non-existent or
negligible. The impact scale of each consequence node was defined as shown in table
5.
Scale Impact
Negligible Negligible or non-existent impact
Low Minor impact
Medium Notable impact
High Substantial impact
Table 5: Consequence severity scale
Several different methods exist for eliciting the content of NPTs. Manual elicitation
by interview is possible but quickly becomes infeasible in non-trivial networks due to
the exponential increase in NPT size with the amount of nodes. The size of a node’s
NPT follows equation 2 below,
size = sc ∗ spnp , (2)
where size denotes the amount of values in the NPT, sc the amount of possible states
of the child node, sp the amount of possible states of the parent nodes and np the
amount of parent nodes. The equation assumes that all parent nodes have the same
amount of possible states.
The interviewed domain experts are likely busy and a very time consuming pro-
cess can thus not be used. Also, the subject matter experts are not necessarily
experienced in statistics and probability theory. Thus it makes sense to employ an
elicitation process which is easy to understand and consumes as little time as possible.
A less time-consuming alternative to manual elicitation is utilizing a parameterized
model, where the NPTs are constructed according to a formula whose variables are
elicited from experts. One common method is using NoisyOR operators [67][68],
which provides a logarithmic reduction in the amount of variables required for de-
scribing the state distribution of a child node. A NoisyOR operator naturally ignores
any interaction between the parent nodes, however, it was determined during the first
stage interview that no significant interaction exists between the risk nodes. Using a
NoisyOR operator for describing the state of a child node is however only practical if
all nodes are Boolean. For the purpose of multivalued nodes, a generalization named
Noisy-MAX exists. However, estimating the variables of a Noisy-MAX operator
becomes increasingly difficult and inaccurate with a large amount of parent nodes.
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Another method used by Fenton et al. [55] includes estimating the distribution of a
node’s value using the truncated normal distribution. In this method, the average
and variance of the distribution are defined as a function of the node’s parent’s
values, where the function is defined by the experts. This general method provides a
means to elicit large NPTs quickly and relatively effortlessly but can only be used
with so called ranked nodes which represent an abstraction of a continuous variable.
Even if the underlying variable of the aforementioned 3-step impact scale could be
represented as a continuous variable, the inclusion of the fourth step negligible does
not allow this representation.
For the purpose of this risk assessment, a method was designed with the objective of
being easy to understand even by experts with little or no statistical experience. The
resulting method consisted of assessing each risk-consequence-pair individually and
thereafter combining this information into a NPTs using a tool discussed in section
4.1. The process is visualized in figure 10 and described in more detail below. Due
to practical and technical reasons, one of the interviews only followed this process
approximately.
Figure 10: Expert elicitation stage 2 interview process
First the interviewees were shown qualitative model built based on data gathered
during the first stage interviews. Figure 11 in section 4 shows a subset of the model,
which describes the risk events that can cause leakage of personal data. The ex-
perts were also provided with the documents, included in appendix D, defining and
illustrating the different risk events, consequences and their severities. The experts
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were then asked to validate the completeness and accuracy of the model including
the existence of relationships between the nodes. During this validation stage, the
number of nodes did not increase or reduce but one additional causal relationship
between two risks was added. Second, the experts were queried about conditional
probabilities of risks with direct mutual relationships. If statistical data was available
for the marginal occurrence of the risk, this value was used as a baseline for the query.
The result for each node was a 1x2 or 2x2 NPT of probability values, depending on
whether the node had a parent or not.
Next, each risk-consequence-pair was assessed individually and for each pair, the
following two questions were asked: (1) how likely is it that occurrence of the risk
leads to this consequence, (2) if the risk occurs and leads to this consequence, how
severe are the most likely effects, i.e. how strong is the impact. To elaborate on the
second question, the experts were also asked how likely it is that the impact falls
into each of the impact strength categories (low-medium-high). The interviewee’s
were provided with the example distributions of possible impact strengths shown
in appendix A to ease the process. Typical responses from the experts included
choosing one example distribution and describing a small change to the distribution
with which it would represent the expert’s opinion.
For each consequence, the experts were also asked whether the risk event nodes in the
model contribute 100 % of the respective consequence or whether other relevant risk
events, i.e. latent risks, also exist. If all relevant risks were not portrayed by nodes
in the model, the experts were queried for the combined probability of occurrence
and consequence severity distribution of the latent risks.
This method was easy for experts to understand and follow, which minimized the
time and effort required for familiarizing the experts with the process. However, the
high amount of risk-consequence-pairs caused the method to be more time consuming
than parameterized methods such as NoisyOR [67] or the method which utilizes a
truncated normal distribution [55]. As a counterbalance to the higher amount of time
required, the method used here is not as prone to the typical loss of accuracy when
representing large amounts of variables with a simplified function. Compared to
manual elicitation of NPTs, this method still provided a nearly hundredfold reduction
in variables to be elicited.
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3.4 Results from expert elicitation
3.4.1 Risk events
The original risk list used in the stage 1 interviews included a separation between
three different types of malware, which were (1) spyware, (2) diallerware and (3) other
types of malware. However, interviewee’s found it easier and more logical during the
first stage to consider all malware as one risk category. The main difference between
these malware types concerns the consequences of an infection, wherein a separation
is better made at consequence level as will be defined in subsection 3.4.2. Thus the
three types of malware were combined into one risk named simply malware.
The definition of the risk shoulder surfing was broadened to also cover eavesdropping
on voice calls in the physical proximity of a user, i.e. not on the network. The risks
originally named client side code injection and premium number scam were renamed
to remote code injection and premium number fraud in order to better represent the
risk definitions.
The risk surveillance was originally defined as targeted surveillance on a device,
for example by installing hidden spying tools on it. However, the updated risk list
includes malware, which covers these tools, and on the other hand surveillance on
network level. Thus, the original surveillance was deemed unnecessary. Technical
failures of the network and device, including software crashing, arose as a risk in
several first stage interviews and the risks technical failure of device and technical
failure of network were thus added to the list.
Based on the above and other information received from the experts during the first
stage interviews, the risk list presented in subsection 3.2.2 was updated. Further, in
order to identify the most important risks from this list, each risk event was given
points based on how important the experts viewed it as on average. Each expert was
asked to choose a maximum of 10 most important risk events and order these based
on total importance taking into account both probability and impact. Each risk was
then given points (1-10) based on how high the risk event was on each expert’s list.
The risks were ordered based on total points, hereafter referred to as importance
score. This list of risks including each risk’s importance score can be seen in table 6.
The risks are described in more detail at the end of this subsection. Other risks not
in the scope of this thesis are briefly discussed in section 3.4.3.
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# Risk event name Importance score
1. Loss or theft of device 86
2. Unintentional data disclosure 85
3. Malware 79
4. Technical failure of device 58
5. Unauthorized physical device access 50
6. Network device spoofing attack 42
7. Vendor backdoor 30
8. Surveillance on cellular network level 30
9. Premium number fraud 27
10. Technical failure of network 23
11. Shoulder surfing or eavesdropping 20
12. Phishing 13
13. Sniffing on legitimate networks 11
14. Mobile payment systems abuse 8
15. Remote code injection 8
16. Ad tracking system abuse 6
17. Attacks on decommissioned devices 4
18. Compromising wireless encryption 4
19. Denial of Service 3
20. Remote wipe 2
21. Data mining from cloud uploads 2
22. Cloning SIM card 2
23. Resource abuse 2
Table 6: Final list of risk events and their respective importance scores
The risk importance scores shown in table 6 exhibit a long tail, wherein the four
most important risks represent approximately 50 % of all points. In order to build
a Bayesian network of most important information security risks and consequences
related to smartphone use, the list in table 6 was narrowed down based on importance.
The interviewed experts were all able to name their subjective most important 1.-4.
risks quite easily, while 5.-10. were more difficult to identify and order. Therefore,
the risks for further evaluation were chosen so that all such risks were included, which
were identified by an expert in their respective top 4 risks. The resulting 13 risks are
presented in the upper part of table 6 and detailed descriptions of the risk events
can be found below.
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Loss or theft of device
Loss or theft of device includes all scenarios where a user’s smartphone is lost
or stolen but excludes scenarios where the device is temporarily used by an
unauthorized user and then returned, which are covered by the risk unauthorized
physical device access.
Unintentional data disclosure
Unintentional data disclosure includes all scenarios where a user unknowingly or
unintentionally discloses data through a legitimate application. In this context,
legitimate is defined as something the user has agreed to in the terms and
conditions of the application.
Malware
This threat includes all malicious applications that can run on smartphone
such as spyware, adware and diallerware. This threat does not include applica-
tions which perform legitimate actions such as ad tracking without the user’s
knowledge, if the user has agreed to these actions in the application’s terms
and conditions.
Technical failure of device
This threat includes any technical failure of device hardware or software which
significantly affects the device user in any way. Significant effects can include
for example data loss or unavailability for a significant amount of time. Due to
the complex nature of smartphones, a significant technical failure of the device
is difficult to define unambiguously. The interviewed experts were thus allowed
to use their own judgement when evaluating this risk.
Unauthorized physical device access
Unauthorized physical device access includes all scenarios where an unauthorized
person accesses the smartphone locally. A prerequisite for this risk being realized
is that the unauthorized person is able to bypass the potential logical access
control on the device. However, this risk excludes all unauthorized access by
family members. The reasons behind the exclusion were the relatively high
occurrence and low impact of these situations compared to scenarios where a
less familiar person accesses the device.
Network device spoofing attack
Network device spoofing attack includes all events where a user’s smartphone
connects to a rogue device that impersonates a trusted device such as a WLAN
access point or cellular base station. Depending on the technology, the connec-
tion can be formed automatically or require action from the user. By definition,
the rogue network device must have been deployed with malicious intent, e.g.
to monitor or intercept data from users.
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Vendor backdoor
Vendor backdoor as a risk event describes events where a backdoor or information
collection agent collects data from or controls a smartphone. By definition,
the backdoor or information collection agent was inserted into the device by
the device or OS vendor, either before sale of the device or afterwards as an
update. Other types of malicious software are covered by the risk malware.
The vendor backdoor risk is mainly speculative, since evidence does not exist
to confirm the existence of widely spread backdoors in smartphones.
Surveillance on cellular network level
Surveillance on cellular network level is defined as surveillance or tracking per-
formed on the network level, independent of a user’s device’s security. Methods
for performing such an attack include accessing a network base station, an
operator’s core network or the worldwide SS7 signalling network. For the SS7
signalling network, any insecure network operator could act as a malicious
entry point and allow the attacker to surveil users in other networks.
In addition, network operators are able and likely to collect a significant
amount of data about their users. Some of this data can also be required by
law enforcement to be stored for a certain period of time. While this data
is stored with the network operator, it could be accessed and misused by a
dishonest employee, an outside intruder or a foreign government, for instance.
Premium number fraud
Premium number fraud includes events where billing is caused by calls or
messages to premium rate services without the user’s approval and consent.
This risk includes both scenarios where a user is tricked into calling or sending a
message to a premium rate service as well as scenarios where malware performs
the action without the user’s knowledge.
Technical failure of network
Technical failure of network includes all cellular network failures that signif-
icantly affect smartphone use for at least 1 hour. A network failure can for
example cause unavailability of the whole cellular network, unavailability of
data connections or significantly decreased connection quality. The risk event
is defined to last at least 1 hour in order to exclude small network failures that
cause negligible inconvenience to users but happen relatively often. A Bayesian
networks risk assessment of Finnish mobile network availability found that
the most significant triggers leading to unavailability were natural disasters,
cyber-attacks and bad operation by own employees [76].
Shoulder surfing or eavesdropping
Shoulder surfing or eavesdropping includes purposefully watching, recording or
eavesdropping on a user while they use their smartphone. However, this risk
excludes surveillance performed by family members due to its relatively small
impact but high occurrence.
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Phishing
Phishing includes all scenarios where a user gives personal or confidential
information to an attacker through the smartphone unknowingly.
Sniffing on legitimate networks
Sniffing on legitimate networks includes scenarios where a user’s data traffic is
monitored or intercepted by a third party on a legitimate network. Scenarios
where the attacker has control over the whole network are described in threat
network device spoofing attack.
Mobile payment systems abuse
Mobile payment systems abuse includes attacks that target a payment system
used on smartphones such as Elisa Lompakko or Danske Mobile Pay, or a
mobile banking service.
Remote code injection
Remote code injection includes all scenarios where a smartphone interprets an
untrusted input as commands. Untrusted inputs include instant messages and
websites, for example.
Ad tracking system abuse
Ad tracking system abuse includes all attacks which target an existing ad
tracking system. Aggressive ad tracking libraries collect extensive amounts of
personal information and sometimes leak this information even in plaintext
[71]. Information collected by ad tracking libraries such as Burstly include
sexual orientation, political affiliation, number of children and income [71].
Attacks on decommissioned devices
Attacks on decommissioned devices include scenarios where an outsider recovers
data from a device that has been decommissioned or recycled without properly
wiping its memory.
Compromising wireless encryption
Compromising wireless encryption includes scenarios where an attacker is able
to read or modify the wireless encrypted data traffic between a smartphone
and a cellular base station.
Denial of Service
Denial of Service includes all network-based DoS attacks that target smart-
phones. Unavailability caused by malware on the device is covered by the risk
malware.
Remote wipe
Remote wipe includes scenarios where a smartphone’s memory is emptied using
a remote wipe functionality without the user’s knowledge or approval. Many
modern smartphones include remote wipe functionalities automatically avail-
able for example through Android Device Manager. Also, employer-provided
smartphones may have remote wipe systems administered by the employer.
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Data mining from cloud uploads
Smartphone users often upload large amounts of data to cloud services. Some
uploads are deliberate such as image uploads to social networks while other
information might be uploaded by an application on the device without the
user’s knowledge. Even if any one piece of information would not pose a security
risk or comprise a security breach, modern data mining methods can process
this data in order to gain information whose leak would fulfil the definition of
a security breach.
Cloning SIM card
Cloning a SIM card in order to impersonate another subscriber on the cellular
network.
Resource abuse
Resource abuse includes all threats which intentionally abuse a smartphone’s
resources such as the battery or CPU.
3.4.2 Consequences
One substantial change was made concerning the initial consequence categories de-
scribed in subsection 3.3. The sixth consequence category, access to other devices or
services, was identified to be affected by the same threats as the leakage of personal
data. Thus the separate consequence category was removed and its contents were
merged into the category leakage of personal data.
In addition to the original consequence categories, experts also brought up con-
sequences that affect a user’s reputation. In this definition of consequence categories,
reputation damage caused by the leakage of personal information is covered by the
leakage of personal data. On the other hand, reputation damage could also be caused
by impersonation of the user through a device or service used on the smartphone,
for example by sending an SMS using the user’s subscription. These consequences
were originally included in the category access to other devices and services and thus
now a part of leakage of personal data. Therefore, a separate consequence category
was not deemed necessary for reputational risks.
The final consequence categories are described below.
Leakage of personal data
Leakage of personal data includes all scenarios where non-public information
related to a user’s personal life, as opposed to their work, becomes available to
an attacker or a third party. Also, this category includes scenarios where an
attacker or a third party gains access to a service used by the legitimate user.
Leakage of confidential data
Leakage of confidential data refers to scenarios where information related to
the user’s employer becomes available to an attacker or a third party.
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Data loss or corruption
Data loss or corruption includes all situations where the user permanently loses
access to data or cannot anymore utilize the data due to corruption. This
category also includes scenarios where the data would be technically possible to
recover, but is not recovered due to the user’s lack of knowledge or resources.
Financial consequences
Financial consequences include all direct effects on the user’s or device owner’s
finances. This category does not include financial consequences experienced by
the user’s employer due to confidential data leakage or indirect consequences
to the user such as loss of income due to employment termination caused by
the careless actions that led to the data leakage.
Unavailability of device or services
Unavailability of device or services includes all situations where the user does
not experience full availability and functionality from the device and its services
as compared to a typical baseline availability and functionality experienced
using the same device and network.
3.4.3 Other notions
The interviewed experts also raised other concerns related to smartphone use, which
were not in the scope of this thesis and thus not described in subsection 3.4.1.
One such risk was that of driving while using a smartphone, e.g. talking or tex-
ting. Although this risk can have very severe consequence, it was not classified as
an information security risk since neither the risk event or its consequences relate
closely to information. Another physical safety risk was the possibility of a violent
theft. Expensive smartphones are popular among thieves and using an expensive
smartphone in public could thus theoretically lead to the user becoming the victim
of a violent robbery, which could danger the user’s health.
A technical risk brought up in the interviews goes by the name of BadUSB [72]. This
threat exploits a fundamental weakness in the Universal Serial Bus (USB) standard
which allows USB devices to maliciously monitor or control a computer. Android
phones are one of the devices most suitable for use as an attack vector. This threat
was determined to be out of scope of this thesis, because traditional computers are
the attack target and smartphones are merely a tool for executing the attack.
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4 Bayesian network modelling
4.1 Modelling methods
The qualitative model, i.e. the graphical network of risks, consequences and their
dependencies, was built based on the consolidated results from the first stage inter-
views. A subset of the complete model can be seen in figure 11. The choice of risks to
be included in the network was made based on importance according to the method
described in subsection 3.4.1. All dependencies which were described as significant
by at least one expert, were included in the initial model. The dependencies that had
been described as theoretical and insignificant were left out. When the insignificant
dependencies had been removed, the model did not include any loops to eliminate.
Figure 11: Qualitative model of data leakage consequence and its causes
For the quantitative part of the model, i.e. the NPTs, an arithmetic average was
taken of the probability values and severity distributions given by different experts.
A Microsoft Excel based tool, described in appendix C, was designed to generate
NPTs based on these averages. The possibility of using a weighted average in order
to emphasize specific experts’ responses was also considered. However, due to the
experts’ different areas of expertise, determining a weight for each expert’s answers
was deemed unjustified.
A parameterized model was also considered as an alternative to the tool-based
NPT generation method. However, as described in section 3.3.3, a suitable parame-
terization method was not found.
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4.2 Bayesian network model
The Bayesian network constructed in this thesis describes the most important risk
events and consequences related to smartphone use in Finland during year 2015.
Probabilities in the network describe the probability of an event or consequence for
a single smartphone user during one year. All probabilities, dependencies and effect
strengths have been determined without making any extra presumptions such as
device model, OS or user age.
Figure 12 illustrates the risk events and consequences related to shoulder surf-
ing or eavesdropping, with other risks hidden for clarity. In addition to the possibility
of directly causing leakage of confidential or personal data, shoulder surfing or eaves-
dropping can also lead to theft of the device, for example a scenario where a thief
steals the device after seeing its passcode. Furthermore, the thief might be interested
in accessing the device’s information and services, thus realizing the risk unauthorized
physical device access, as opposed to wiping the device’s memory and selling it.
Figure 12: Bayesian network model demonstrating the risk shoulder surfing or
eavesdropping. The figure depicts the combined consequences of all risk events in the
complete model, but however, most risks are hidden in this figure for clarity.
Figure 13 shows the complete Bayesian Network structure including the nodes’ state
probability distributions. As can be seen from the figure, most risk events in the
network relate to at least two consequences and some also to other risks. However,
the majority of the risks are not directly dependent on other risks included in the
network.
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Figure 13: Complete Bayesian network model of information security risks related to
smartphone use
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4.3 Analysis using Bayesian network model
Figure 14 visualizes the probability of occurrence for each risk, which shows that
most risks are unlikely to occur during one year. However, based on figure 14, experts
believe that almost 50 % of smartphone users become victim to unintentional data
disclosure during a year, i.e. share more information to other parties through their
smartphones than they acknowledge or would be willing to share.
Figure 14: Probabilities of occurrence for each risk
Figure 15 visualizes the probability and severity distribution of consequences when a
risk event occurs. Based on the figure, the risks unintentional data disclosure and
vendor backdoor are both very likely to cause leakage of personal data when they
occur but the effects of vendor backdoor are more likely to be severe.
Figure 15: Consequence distribution of each risk event
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Figure 16 describes the probability distributions of data leakage consequences of
different severities. From the risk assessment results, it seems clear that a data breach
is considerably more likely to concern a smartphone user’s personal information than
confidential information related to the user’s employer. One likely reason for this is
that employer-provided services most often use encryption and strong authentication.
Although businesses and governmental entities usually have an incentive to ensure the
security of services used, personal end-users’ choices rely more on other factors such
as price and ease of use. On the other hand, employer-provided smartphones can also
have built-in security restrictions which limit exposure to any type of vulnerabilities.
Figure 16: Data leakage severity distributions.
Figure 17 shows a sensitivity graph describing the effects of individual risk events on
medium- or high-severity confidential data leakage. According to the analysis, the
consequence is most sensitive to occurrence of unauthorized physical device access or
malware. This is reasonable as an unauthorized user would have access to all services
which do not require additional authentication and malware with elevated access
could access all data on the device and monitor interaction between the device and
user. However, most devices used for confidential purposes should require a passcode
for unlocking the device, which might not be sufficiently represented in the results.
Figure 17: Effect of occurrence of individual risk events on medium- or high-severity
leakage of confidential data
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Figure 18 represents the effects of individual risks on medium- or high-severity
personal data leakage. The results resemble those of confidential data leakage in
figure 16. However, two clear differences exist between these results: (1) all risk events
have a significantly higher probability of affecting personal data than confidential
data and (2) the effect of unintentional data disclosure is much higher relative to
other risks’ effects on leakage of personal than confidential data.
Figure 18: Effect of occurrence of individual risk events on medium- or high-severity
leakage of personal data
Figure 19 shows the severity distribution of personal data leakage in a scenario where
it is known that unintentional data disclosure has not happened. According to the
created model, the majority of low-severity occurrences are caused by unintentional
disclosure of data by the user. However, a considerable probability of personal data
leakage still remains, especially for medium- and high-severity events.
Figure 19: Leakage of personal data when unintentional data disclosure is set to
false
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Loss or corruption of data related to smartphone usage seems to be a relatively
unlikely scenario as can be seen in figure 13. Figure 20 shows that the risks leading
to data loss or corruption are most often loss or theft of device or technical failure of
device.
Figure 20: Effect of occurrence of individual risk events on medium- or high-severity
data loss or corruption
According to the model, low-severity and medium-severity unavailability is very
rarely caused by anything else than technical failures of the device or network. On
the other hand, high unavailability is rarely caused by anything else than loss or theft
the device. The effects of individual risks on medium- or high-severity unavailability
can be seen in figure 21.
Figure 21: Effect of occurrence of individual risk events on medium- or high-severity
unavailability
The sensitivity graphs in figure 17, 18, 20 and 21 show that a significant amount of
smartphone information security incidents are caused by risks which are dependent
on insecure action by the user, such as unauthorized physical device access, malware
and phishing. Users clearly have an important role in securing their smartphone use
and therefore, there is a need for more security awareness among smartphone users.
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4.4 Controls and mitigants
The Bayesian network visualized in figure 13 in subsection 4.2 defines from an informa-
tion security perspective the risk events and consequences related to smartphone use.
In addition, the network can be extended with controls, which affect the probability
of the risk event, and with mitigants, which affect the probability and severity of
consequences when the risk event occurs. Figure 22 shows an example where careful
use of WLANs decreases the probability of becoming victim to sniffing on legitimate
networks and careful use of mobile applications decreases the severity of consequences
in such a scenario.
Figure 22: Risk event and consequence with example control and mitigant
Some of the most important controls and mitigants identified during the risk assess-
ment process are discussed below.
Use of insecure applications
Use of insecure applications significantly impacts the consequences of becoming
victim to a network device spoofing attack or sniffing on legitimate networks.
If the operating system and all applications on the device only use secure
APIs and strong encryption for communication, an attacker should not easily
discover sensitive information. Also, if reliable two-way authentication is used,
a Man-in-the-Middle attack should also not be feasible. In addition to these
two risks, badly designed application security can also benefit malware which
could potentially gain access to another application’s data or functionalities.
Use of insecure applications, or lack thereof, can thus be viewed as a mitigant
to the aforementioned risks.
Device updates
Another similar mitigant is how quickly updates are installed on the device
when vulnerabilities are discovered. The speed of update process is often
dependent on the operating system developer, the device vendor and the user
as well as possible other quarters.
Use of unencrypted WLANs
The risks sniffing on legitimate networks and device spoofing attack are most
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feasible if the user connects to unencrypted WLANs. The use of unencrypted
wireless networks can thus be seen as a control to these risks.
Use of cloud services
Cloud services for smartphones often offer extensive backup functionalities
and can thus mitigate data loss consequences. However, cloud services also
introduce new threats against the confidentiality of this information. In addition
to the possible vulnerabilities in the data storage solutions and the user account
security, a cloud service provider could also willingly share the information
with third parties such as governmental agencies.
Device OS
Different smartphone operating systems vary with regards to their security
measures and application architecture such as described in subsection 2.1.1.
According to research by Verizon [64], most of today’s malware is targeted at
Android users and the use of an Android device can thus be viewed as a control
to the malware risk event. This is likely mostly due to the relatively open
policies of Google Android’s Play Store described in section 2.1.1. In contrast,
most insecurities in legitimate applications are found on iOS applications [71],
which can be viewed as a control to risks such as phishing and sniffing on
legitimate networks.
Installation of applications outside the official application store
Although some malware exists on all official application stores, most of the
malware in circulation exists outside these [75]. Prohibiting installation from
other sources can thus work as a control to the risk malware. On Android
devices, this is a setting which the user can toggle on and off. On standard
iOS devices, this is not possible and requires "jail breaking" the device.
Based on the controls and mitigants discussed above, the following high-level recom-
mendations could be given:
• A user should ensure that their smartphone is always updated to the newest
software version. Also if possible, users should choose devices whose vendors
release security updates quickly when vulnerabilities are discovered.
• The use of unencrypted WLAN’s should be avoided. If one must be used, a
secure VPN connection is recommended.
• Cloud services are an easy solution to backing up data from smartphones, but
a user should consider its privacy and confidentiality implications before use.
• Smartphone users should install applications only from the official application
stores and disable installation from other sources.
In addition to the aforementioned variables, many other controls and mitigants
exist which depend on the user’s actions. In essence, the user’s knowledge and
understanding of choices and their respective security implications have a significant
impact on the security of their smartphone use.
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5 Discussions
5.1 Assessment of results
The Bayesian network model built during this risk assessment and described in
subsection 4.2 seems realistic as a representation of the actual risk space surrounding
smartphone use. The results do not include any significant surprises but give more
insight into the importance of different risks and their consequences. The author has
not found any similar prior research.
The information elicited from experts is mostly well in line with that found in
statistics and existing research. For example, the conditional probability that the
data on a lost or stolen smartphone is accessed, reflects the results of Symantec’s
Honey Stick Project [83]. Some risks also exhibit a high variance between different
expert’s answers, such as the unintentional data disclosure risk, where estimates of
probability ranged from less than 1 % to 95 %. However, the average of answers
received from the 8 experts seem realistic. One special threat that arose in this
risk assessment is the speculative vendor backdoor, for which the experts had very
different opinions. According to some experts, at least 10 % of the smartphones in
Finland are likely to include an active backdoor designed by the device vendor or
OS developer, whereas some experts believe that none of the smartphones used in
Finland have such a backdoor.
Some experts were also uncomfortable estimating probabilities without any sta-
tistical data. Data leaks regarding company confidential information is one aspect
where experts felt particularly insecure due to lack of information. It was also brought
up that businesses do not necessarily report all data breaches to outside parties due
to possible reputational damage.
The constructed model is essentially a document of the 8 interviewed experts’ average
opinions, which were elicited using a process designed to introduce as little bias as
possible. Due to the high variance in the experts’ opinions, it is reasonable to assume
that a similar process with a larger amount of experts could have generated slightly
different results. A biased sample of experts, such as choosing all experts from one
organization, would most likely have caused significant bias in the results.
5.2 Exploitation of results
The Bayesian network model can be used as is to illustrate the significance of
different smartphone risks in different scenarios. For example, the most important
risks are very different when a user is concerned with leakage of data than with loss
or corruption of data. The model can be of use to security professionals who need to
identify and communicate relevant risks related to smartphones.
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The model could be applied to other countries by updating the parameter values
and possibly also the structure to represent the local environment. Some risks such
as the mobile payment systems abuse did not reach the top 13 risks in this assess-
ment due to their scarcity of users in Finland. However, in a country where these
services are more popular, the risk would likely merit an individual node in the model.
The use cases of smartphones are still evolving rapidly and thus the risks of smart-
phone use change constantly. In order to ensure validity of the model, the parameter
values as well as the structure should be updated regularly. The parameter values
should be updated at least yearly and the structure should be re-evaluated each time
the use cases or technical features of smartphones undergo significant changes.
5.3 Future prospects
A common expectation between the experts is that the mobile risk space is going
to undergo significant changes in the near future. One opinion is that the ever-
strengthening connection between smartphones and the physical world will cause
users to carry around more and more sensitive information on their phones. With
the growing number of mobile banking and mobile payment systems, the amount of
potential targets for financial attacks on smartphones is also quickly rising. Although
attacks on mobile payment systems or banking services were not identified as a large
threat at this moment in Finland, the interviewed experts expect these incidents to
become more common in the future.
As discussed in section 2.1.1, smartphones often include a large amount of sen-
sors that collect different data. Malicious access to this data is becoming increasingly
threatening as more information is continually collected through these sensors. Risks
such as malware and vendor backdoor present a threat that could continuously trans-
fer the sensor data to another party.
According to a 2015 data breach report [64], an insignificantly small part of re-
ported data breaches involve mobile malware or smartphones. On the other hand,
traditional malware is prevalent and still evolving. There is no clear reason why the
focus of attackers would not shift towards mobile such as the focus of users has done.
While mobile phishing is not yet a large problem, research shows that many services
used on smartphones are vulnerable to sophisticated phishing attacks [73]. The
interaction between web sites and mobile applications as well as interaction between
applications could in most cases be spoofed by attackers in an unsuspicious way,
leading to undetected attacks.
5.4 Further development of model
In the current model, the consequences such as leakage of personal data do not
specify the concrete effects they have on a user’s life. As further development of the
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model, the risk events and consequences could be divided into more specific events
and effects such as reputational damage and indirect financial consequences. Also,
the risk events in the final model are not necessarily individual risk events but rather
categories of risk events, such as loss or theft of device. The model would be more
informative but also more complex, if it made a distinction between each concrete
event such as loss and theft of device.
Another possible extension of the network would be to add demographic parameters
such as age, occupation or income of the user. With demographic parameters, the
network would give more insight into an individual user’s vulnerabilities as well as
what kind of security awareness is lacking with each demographic group. Extending
the network with demographic parameters could allow the model to be used in
insurance to determine the probability and thus appropriate insurance premium
for scenarios which cause financial consequences such as loss or theft of the device.
Smartphone vendors and operators could use the model to deliver highly targeted
security awareness information to users.
The model could also be extended with controls and mitigants, such as those de-
scribed in subsection 4.4. Such a model would give insight into what causes the
occurrences of risk events and how these can be prevented. The extended model
could be used for identifying the most dangerous practices of smartphone usage as
well as which security measures would be most useful for prevention or mitigation of
risks. By determining the costs of different security measures, a cost-benefit analysis
of controls and mitigants could also be performed. Such a model would be beneficial
to most organizations’ IT departments, for instance. Other potential value networks
could describe the viewpoint of an attacker, who wishes to gain money with minimal
investment and risk, or a consumer, who wishes to avoid security incidents with
minimal cost. However, quantifying potential damages is difficult due to the lack of
available data.
5.5 Evaluation of risk assessment process
Based on this risk assessment, Bayesian networks seem suitable for information
security risk assessment. The method produces a very flexible model which can be
used for various kinds of analysis such as sensitivity analysis. However, the process for
gathering the necessary information and constructing the network is time-consuming
and poses challenges for networks with a large amount of nodes. There is clearly room
for improvement in the Bayesian network tools provided by vendors for elicitation
and consolidation of expert opinions. Efficient tools which ease this process could
make Bayesian networks considerably more practical.
The difficulty of the information gathering process also depends on how much prior
knowledge exists concerning the domain. Existing statistical information concerning
the probabilities of different events is especially helpful for construction of Bayesian
networks.
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One of the aspects that Bayesian networks are especially suitable for, is taking
into account and analysing the effects of interaction between several risk nodes. How-
ever, in this case most risks only had a direct causal relationship the consequences.
Thus this assessment did not unveil the full potential of using Bayesian networks for
risk assessment.
The expert elicitation method designed during this study is seen to be suitable
for the purpose. The method is easy for experts to understand and follow, which is
of essence when interviewing busy domain experts. However, the large amount of
risk-consequence pairs caused some visible fatigue of the experts during interviews.
Based on this experience, elicitation sessions longer than the two-hour-sessions held
during this process cannot be recommended. On the contrary, it could be beneficial
to split the sessions into even shorter intervals with at least short breaks in between.
The total time required with each expert, 4 hours, is reasonable for the purpose of
this risk assessment. However, the time required with experts increases linearly with
the amount of nodes in the network. Therefore, this method could easily become
too time-consuming for elicitation of larger networks. Although this method is more
time-consuming than a parameterized method, it provides more accurate results.
There is still clearly potential for both researchers and Bayesian network tool vendors
to develop less time-consuming methods of consolidating expert opinion.
The process generates results that are easy to interpret and utilize to build the
Bayesian network model. However, while the generation of the Bayesian network
model from interview results is mostly automatized, any interaction between risk
nodes must be manually taken into account.
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6 Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis was to perform an information security risk assessment
of smartphones using Bayesian networks. Most information was gathered during
a two-stage expert elicitation process, in which 8 domain experts were queried for
the relevant information security risks, their causal relationships, consequences and
quantitative probabilities. The experts represent various experience, knowledge and
viewpoints related to information security, thus ensuring the completeness of the
elicited information. The expert interviews followed a process designed as part of
this thesis in order to facilitate accurate and simple elicitation.
The outcome of this thesis is a Bayesian network model which documents the
information security risks related to smartphone use and can be extended with new
data when available. The model shows that the most important risks in Finland
include traditional information security risks such as malware and phishing, very
general risks such as loss or theft of device and relatively new risks such as unin-
tentional data disclosure through legitimate applications. Also, the experts raised a
concern over more speculative risks such as surveillance on network level and vendor
backdoors. Most of the identified risks are strongly dependent on the user’s own
actions and security awareness. Therefore, promoting smartphone security awareness
among end-users should be beneficial.
Bayesian networks are found to be an effective method for documenting and analysing
causal knowledge of domain experts. The model lends itself well to different types
of sensitivity analysis, which would be especially useful when analysing potential
controls and mitigants for risks. The expert elicitation method designed was easy
for experts to understand and delivered accurate results. The process was however
time-consuming, which could be eased with more effective tools. Both Bayesian
networks and the expert elicitation method could be applied to other risk assessments
as well. Further research is warranted for developing more effective tools and methods
for expert elicitation and consolidation of results.
As is, the model can be utilized by security specialists and IT personnel to de-
termine and communicate the most relevant risks in their environment. As future
research, the Bayesian network model could be extended with controls and mitigants,
which could reduce the probability of risk events or severity of consequences. With the
said extension, the model could be used to analyse specific actions for strengthening
the smartphone security of organisations or end-users.
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Appendix A Examples of consequence severity dis-
tributions
Example consequence severity distributions were shown to the experts during the
interviews to ease the process of describing a severity distribution. An example of
these distributions is shown in figure A1.
Figure A1: Example consequence severity distributions
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Appendix B Tool for facilitating expert interviews
An Excel-based tool was designed in order to facilitate the stage 1 interviews with
experts such as described in section 3.3.2. Figures B1 and B2 show two views of this
tool, one for ordering the identified risks by importance and another for identifying
the existence of causal relationships between these risks.
Figure B1: Step 3 of Excel-based tool for facilitating expert interviews
Figure B2: Step 9 of Excel-based tool for facilitating expert interviews
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Appendix C Tool for calculating NPTs
The node probability tables (NPT) in the Bayesian network were calculated using
an Excel-based tool. Figure C1 shows a part of the consolidated data from existing
research and expert interviews while figure C2 shows a part of a final NPT, which
was then exported to AgenaRisk.
Figure C1: Partial consolidated data regarding the consequence leakage of confidential
data
Figure C2: Partial NPT for the consequence leakage of confidential data
Risk events Explanations 
Network device spoofing attack User connects to a rogue network device that impersonates a 
trusted device such as a WLAN access point, cellular base station 
or Bluetooth device. Depending on the technology, connecting 
might happen automatically or require action from the user. By 
definition, the rogue network device has been deployed in order to 
monitor and/or intercept data from users. 
Sniffing on legitimate data network Packet sniffing performed by an attacker on a data network used 
by the smartphone, most likely an unencrypted WLAN network. 
Can also lead to a Man in the Middle -attack. 
Surveillance on cellular network Surveillance or tracking performed on network level, independent 
of a user’s device’s security. This could be performed for example 
by accessing the SS7 signaling network, a local operator’s core 
network, a base station or data collected by a network operator. 
Malware Any malicious software. Can be for example disguised as a 
legitimate application or embedded into a legitimate application. 
Includes all kinds of spyware, ransomware, diallerware, 
surveillance software etc. 
Premium number fraud Billing caused by calls or messages to premium rate services 
without the user’s approval and consent. Includes both tricking a 
user into making the call/message themselves as well as malware 
that performs the action without a user’s knowledge. 
Vendor backdoor A backdoor or information collection agent collects data from or in 
some way controls the device. By definition, the backdoor was 
present when the device was bought as opposed to malware which 
infects devices in use. Backdoor can be for example enforced and 
used by a government. 
Loss or theft of device Device gets stolen or is lost. 
Unauthorized physical device access Accessing the device locally without the owner’s or user’s 
permission. Note: Unauthorized access by family members is 
excluded. 
Technical failure of device Any technical failure of hardware or software (crashing) that 
meaningfully affects the device user. 
Technical failure of network Cellular network failure that significantly affects smartphone use for 
at least 1 hour. 
Unintentional data disclosure Unknowingly disclosing data through a legitimate application for 
example due to incomplete understanding of privacy policy/settings 
or due to settings changes caused by another user/application. 
Phishing Misleading a user to willingly give out sensitive information such as 
user credentials. 
Shoulder surfing or eavesdropping Purposefully watching and/or recording video of a user use his 
smartphone. Purposefully listening and/or recording audio of a user 
speaking into his smartphone. Note: Shoulder surfing or 
eavesdropping by family members is excluded. 
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Appendix D Risk event and consequence descrip-
tions used in stage 2 interviews
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